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Herding among analysts emerges when analysts give priority to their peers´ 
opinions instead of their own beliefs or information. Some circumstances may 
enhance or restrain this type of behavior. We postulate that market sentiment is 
one of them. This paper analyzes the effect that investor sentiment may have on 
analysts´ herding behavior in the UK. Our results suggest that “easy situations” 
such as analyzing easy-to-value securities and releasing optimistic information at 
times of high market sentiment clearly reduce herding practices, whereas herding 
clearly increases in difficult situations when analysts have to release negative 
information at moments of high investor sentiment. 
 
 
Keywords: Herding, investor sentiment, analyst forecasts, hard-to-value firms, 
behavioral finance. 
 




Analysts herding: when does sentiment matter? 
 
Introduction 
Herding among analysts emerges when analysts think they should give priority 
to their peers´ opinions instead of their own beliefs or information. Besides the 
usefulness of detecting herding among security analysts, the identification of those 
situations that enhance or restrain such practices may also be of interest in terms 
of providing a deep understanding of stock markets and behavioral finance. 
Presumably, analysts herd when they have doubts about the results of their own 
analysis, causing them to be attentive to recommendations released by their 
colleagues. Generally speaking, analysts should analyze fundamentals in order to 
release their forecasts or recommendations, but there are a number of 
circumstances which may hamper this analysis. Investor sentiment is one of them. 
Sentiment is one of the most important drivers of prices, not based on 
fundamentals, which can make prices deviate from their “rational” equilibrium. 
Furthermore, according to the popular market saying attributed to Keynes, 
“Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent”. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect that investor sentiment, considered 
as the global feeling or attitude of investors toward a particular financial market, 
may have on analysts´ herding behavior. However, as investor sentiment is not 
based on fundamentals, analysts or sophisticated investors and traders may find 
different levels of difficulty in detecting stocks that are overvalued or undervalued 
depending on the type of asset they are dealing with. The degree of difficulty in 
analyzing a particular firm can make its stock prices more or less sensitive to 
market sentiment and can make analysts more prone, or not, to herd. For this 
reason, in order to develop the argument of the paper, we initially test the 
existence of mimetic behavior by analysts assessing stocks listed on the UK market 
and then we test whether investor sentiment affects such behavior. The effect of 
sentiment on herding behavior has not yet been studied in depth. To extend this 
line of research further, we also want to test whether sentiment is more likely to 
affect herding when analysts face difficult situations that can generate or 
accentuate their feeling of risk, which they consider, may jeopardize their 
professional prestige or promotion prospects. In other words, at moments when 
they forecast hard to value stocks and/or their information about a company results 
in an assessment or forecast inconsistent with the general investor sentiment 
3 
 
(basically a negative recommendation or forecast when investor sentiment is highly 
positive but also a positive forecast when investor sentiment is highly negative).  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the existence of herding among 
analysts in the UK market has to date been little explored. Given that the UK 
stock market is the most important Anglo-Saxon market in Europe and one of the 
most relevant financial markets worldwide, this gap needs to be filled. Second, and 
more importantly, investor sentiment is introduced as a new explanatory element 
in the analysis. This sentiment variable is shown to affect analysts´ optimistic bias 
and, to the best of our knowledge, it has not hitherto been considered in the 
analysis of herding.  Given the behavioral connotation of both herding and investor 
sentiment, we think that sentiment may largely explain herding behavior, at least 
under specific circumstances or situations that make fundamental assessment 
more difficult. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops the theoretical 
framework and testable hypotheses, section 3 describes the database and the 
construction of the study variables, section 4 contains the methodology applied and 
an analysis of the aim of study. Finally, section 5 outlines the main conclusions of 
the study.  
 
2.-Theoretical framework and testable hypothesis  
 
Analysts gather private and public information about firms playing an 
important role in financial markets as information intermediaries. Their reports 
can help investors in their decision-making process (Ke and Yu, 2009) thus 
reducing the information asymmetry that exists between the firm and its 
shareholders and between potential buyers and sellers of shares.  
Previous analysis has shown the importance of analysts’ reports (Givoly and 
Lakonishok (1984), Fredericksons and Miller (2004), or Ke and Yu (2009), among 
others). Nevertheless, others have questioned their usefulness due to the existence 
of an optimistic bias in their forecasts [see, for example, Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999), Hong and Kubik (2003), Chen and Jiang (2006) or Ramnath et al (2008)]. 
Given that analysts’ need to maintain access to important management-provided 
information, they may attempt to curry favor with management, making them 
reluctant to issue sell recommendations or negative opinions (e.g., Francis and 
Philbrick, 1993, Francis and Soffer, 1997). Sell recommendations may also 
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jeopardize the investment banking business of the analysts’ employers. Lin and 
McNichols (1998) or Michaely and Womack (1999), among others, offer evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis.  
As well as their optimistic bias, analysts have also shown herding behavior. This 
crowd effect or mimetic behavior appears as a result of the agents´ risk perception 
and their emotional ability to control it. Indeed, behavioral finance theory allows 
some emotional responses to be compatible with agents’ optimizing behavior 
(Elster (1998), Lo (1999), Loewenstein (2000), Peters and Slovic (2000), Thaler 
(1991), Shefrin (2000)). This behavior is also reflected in financial analysts. Olsen 
(1996) or De Bondt and Forbes (1999) are some of the first authors to analyze 
herding behavior among analysts.  
Herding occurs when individuals decide to imitate decisions made by other 
market agents, who they believe to be better informed. In this sort of situation, 
decision-makers disregard their private information and own beliefs and adopt the 
line of earlier decisions by others. Following Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), 
there are three main herding motives, namely information-based herding (when 
analysts lack confidence in their private information and there is significant 
uncertainty about the quality of public information), reputation-based herding 
(when analysts prefer to get closer to the consensus in order to avoid risking  their 
reputation on the grounds of being personally  mistaken) and compensation-based 
herding (in order to avoid a larger negative pay-off when  remuneration depends on 
how one´s performance compares with that of other similar professionals). Given 
that analysts are considered to be well-informed agents, reputation and 
compensation based herding seem to be obvious explanations for their imitative 
behavior. Furthermore, if some stocks offer a higher degree of uncertainty on being 
analyzed, information-based herding may also occur. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
Roll (1992), Rajan (1994), Trueman (1994), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Brennan 
and Li (2008) or Maug and Naik (2011) are some of the leading references 
explaining why reputational or financial gains may induce analysts to get closer to 
the consensus forecast, ignoring their own beliefs or information.  
Analysts finding themselves in this type of situation will tend to keep any 
extreme views to themselves, adjust their forecast towards the consensus and avoid 
standing out from their peers. The underlying argument is that collective errors 
are less detrimental to an analyst’s reputation or financial gain than individual 
errors. In general terms, this feeling is apparent regardless of whether analysts are 
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issuing positive or negative recommendations or forecasts. Nevertheless, despite 
this general logical argument, empirical research in the US market does not offer 
unanimous results. Whereas some papers such as those by Kim and Pantzalis 
(2003), Krishnan et al. (2005), Clement and Tse (2005) or Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2010), among others, find evidence of herding behavior,  others do not find general 
evidence of this type of behavior (Zitzewitz (2001), Chen and Jiang (2006), 
Bernhardt et al. (2006) or Mensah and Yang (2008)). Outside the USA market, few 
studies reveal herding behavior. These few include a study of the German market 
by Naujoks et al. (2009) and of the Chinese market by Tsai-Hui et al. (2013).  
Given this background, our first testing hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Analysts in the UK market herd. They herd regardless of whether 
they are issuing positive or negative forecasts.  
 
According to Baker and Wurgler (2007), investor sentiment is a basic component 
of behavioral finance. Investor sentiment can be broadly defined as the mood and 
expectation about future cash flows or investment risks that are not justified by the 
facts at hand. In theory, those “irrational” investors who usually have less 
knowledge, trading experience and information processing skills, may be highly 
influenced by their sentiment and are more emotional than those who are 
traditionally considered rational investors or arbitrageurs. Under a general 
perspective, the influence of sentiment and irrational investors should be 
diversified away in a portfolio. But this is not necessarily the case in the presence 
of limited arbitrage and/or if unsophisticated investors do not trade randomly and 
follow positive-feedback strategies (they buy when prices rise and sell when prices 
fall). 
According to De Long et al. (1990), many forms of behavior commonly found in 
financial markets may be described as positive feedback trading. As a general 
approach, positive feedback strategies can refer to a pattern of behavior in which a 
positive outcome gives the confidence to pursue further positive outcomes. This 
comes from emotional extrapolative expectations about prices or emotional trend 
chasing. But according to Smith et al. (1988), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), 
Lakonishok et al. (1991), Greenwood and Nagel (2009) or Bank and Brustbauer 
(2014), institutional, rational, sophisticated, and professional investors may be 
prone to sentiment too. In fact, the key to success for an investor is not only the 
ability to calculate an asset’s fundamental value, but also to forecast actions, such 
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as positive feedback strategies, of other investors. Therefore, even informed 
investors should track those features such as trading volume, price indicators and 
trend indicators that may reveal shifts in sentiment.  
Evidence can be found in the financial literature of a significant relationship 
between investor sentiment and market returns (Baker and Wurgler (2006), Baker 
and Wurgler (2007), Brown and Cliff (2005) or Lee et al. (2002), among others). 
Additionally, the financial literature has shown that investor sentiment is a key 
variable for explaining analysts´ behavior. It has been seen that in times of 
euphoria, analysts´ forecasts tend to be more optimistic (Bagnoli et al. (2009)). A 
number of papers have shown analysts´ inability to disassociate themselves from 
market optimism, which affects forecasting and recommendation processes 
separately (Qian (2009), Bagnoli et al. (2009), Hribar and McInnish (2012) or 
Corredor et al. (2013, 2014)). Along the same lines, Eickhoff and Muntermann 
(2016) relate analysts’ reports with social media sentiment. 
However, the translation of this effect to herding behavior is not obvious and 
has not yet been studied in depth. Why should analysts tend to herd differently 
when there is a positive or a negative feeling in the market? Because sentiment is 
perceived as being closely related with the consensus. Sentiment measures the 
emotional state of the capital market and indicates how bullish or bearish investors 
are in the market. It may therefore also influence many analysts´ perceptions and 
opinions. In general, evidence from the field of psychology shows that people with 
positive sentiment tend to make optimistic choices and people with negative 
sentiment make pessimistic choices (Arkes et al. (1988), Bower (1981) and Wright 
and Bower (1992)). If, under specific circumstances, analysts tend to adjust their 
forecasts towards the consensus and avoid standing out from their peers, we should 
expect market sentiment to influence herd behavior.  
Let us take the case of an analyst who receives negative information about the 
firm that he is analyzing. He is prone to make a negative recommendation or 
forecast. Should he be influenced by a largely positive market sentiment? 
Individuals have limited processing ability and they concentrate their time and 
attention on highly visible information. It is here where sentiment analysis comes 
into play. In a highly positive sentiment context, stock demand increases, prices 
rise and those following positive feedback strategies contribute to the positive 
feeling. As rational and professional agents, analysts may anticipate the reaction 
and may prefer to be cautious. They may tend to smooth their forecasts or 
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recommendations, in order not to risk their prestige and remuneration, assuming 
that their peers do the same. The financial literature reports that analysts tend to 
underreact to negative information (and overreact to positive information) in order 
to improve access to management and, consequently, the accuracy of future 
forecasts (see, Das et al. (1998)). They need to cultivate a reputation for forecasting 
expertise, especially on the buy-side, if they want to achieve a higher professional 
status (Hong and Kubik (2003)). This scenario illustrates how investor sentiment 
can influence herding behavior by analysts when they need to combine a negative 
recommendation or forecast with positive investor sentiment (Simon and Curtis 
(2011) or Ke and Yu (2009) discuss the effectiveness of the translation of forecasts 
into recommendations). However, investor sentiment may cause an asymmetric 
reaction on the analyst’s herding behavior when sentiment moves in the same 
direction as the recommendation or forecast. That is to say, when the forecast 
conveys positive expectations and the investor sentiment is high (or even when the 
forecast conveys negative expectations and the investor sentiment is low), the 
analyst could feel less constrained and less afraid to deviate from the consensus. 
Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested may be formulated as follows: 
H2: Herding by analysts is influenced by investor sentiment but such an 
influence does not necessarily induce symmetric effects whether they 
release positive or negative information.  
 
Not all the recommendations or forecasts issued by analysts are made with the 
same level of difficulty, as Olsen (1996) states.  
Difficult situations have been defined in the literature. Generally, they include 
situations when analysts issue negative forecasts or recommendations and, 
particularly, when negative forecasts or recommendations coincide with highly 
positive investor sentiment and when analysts are faced with hard-to- value stocks. 
Like any other market participant, analysts, although more informed, are also 
affected by limited attention which can have an impact on their forecasting ability 
and on their career outcomes (Choi and Gupta-Mukherjee (2016)). Limited 
attention and its consequences are more likely to appear when analysts evaluate 
hard-to-value stocks. In line with previous studies (Baker and Wurgler (2006)) 
among others), the assessment difficulty we want to analyze is most likely to be 




According to these arguments, we propose our third hypothesis: 
H3: Herding by analysts is more likely to arise in difficult situations:  
H3a-when their information induces negative forecasts at times of highly 
positive investor sentiment 




Our analysis covers all non-financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
from 1994 to 2016. According to the World Stock Exchange Federation, the London 
SE Group is Europe’s largest in capitalization terms. This fact is an interesting 
feature for our research, because as far as we know the study of herding among 
analysts has been focused on the US market. Undoubtedly both the US and the UK 
markets share many similarities because both belong to the Anglo-Saxon system 
(low ownership concentration, high stock liquidity, and high level of creditor 
protection), and their private investors are characterized by an individualistic 
behaviour which could suggest a stronger propensity for herding practices. 
However, there are also some differences between these two markets such as their 
size and, particularly  interesting in this case, the degree of analyst coverage. This 
is much lower in the UK market,  which makes this market worth studying.  
In order to obtain the variables required for calculating the herding measure, we 
use individual-level information provided by analysts’ releases. Our analysis uses 
individual-level one-year-ahead (FY1) forecasts, consensus median EPS forecasts 
and actual earnings obtained by the firms in one fiscal year  . In order to ensure 
data quality, any forecasts issued less than 90 days prior to firms’ profits 
announcements were removed from the sample. This data is taken from the 
Factset database1. The reason for this choice of database is that it provides fuller 
coverage in Europe than the I/B/E/S (Balboa, et al. (2008)).  
In line with Mensah and Yang (2008), this analysis includes control variables in 
order to rule out certain effects. One is the forecast horizon, which is taken as the 
number of days between an analyst's forecast issue and the end of that fiscal year 
(HOR). Another is the number of forecasts used (NEPS). The number of analysts 
                                                          
1 As well as the major international firms that regularly send their recommendations to I/B/E/S, 
contributors to this database include some domestic analysts, which results in wider coverage in 
European countries. Nevertheless, like other forecast databases, FactSet is affected by potential 
survivorship bias, and also selection bias, because it collects recommendations and forecasts from 
brokerage houses that collaborate on a voluntary basis. Correction of these two biases is not possible. 
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following a firm in a given fiscal year is captured in the NAFF variable. Finally, 
changes in historical earnings stability (CHES) and average analyst forecasting 
errors (FERR) for a given firm in a given fiscal year are included in the model.  
In order to observe the impact of analysts herding on different stocks, we group 
them into quintiles by size (SIZE), volatility (VOL), book-to-market ratio (BTM) 
and dividend per share (DPS)2. The group of stocks associated with the hardest to 
value, thus the most vulnerable to investor sentiment biases and herding effects, 
contains stocks characterized by extreme BTM ratios, low market cap value, high 
volatility and low dividend payouts. The data were sourced from Datastream 
(Thomson Financial). 
The fact that the firms are sorted into quintiles for each stock characteristic 
allows a comparison between the extreme quintiles (the fifth and the first). 
Following papers dealing with the sensitivity of cognitive biases (Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) or Corredor et al. (2014) among others), the quintiles classed as 
hard-to-value (HVQ) include low market cap value stocks, low dividend payouts, 
high volatility stocks and high BTM ratios. The easy-to-value quintiles (EVQ) are 
the high market cap value stocks, high dividend payouts, low volatile stocks and 
high growth opportunities stocks. 
There is a variety of investor sentiment measures although there is no 
consensus about which is the best proxy for this unobservable variable3. Some 
recent papers (Baker et al. (2012) and Chang et al. (2012)) build composite 
indicators that capture the commonality between various individual proxies and, 
more specifically, construct global sentiment indices from local sentiment indices.  
Following this approach, in this paper two different sentiment indicators are used: 
the UK sentiment index as a proxy for a local sentiment index (SentUK) and a 
global sentiment index (SentGlobal) as a proxy for a world sentiment index, given 
that our sample of analysts and their brokerage houses all operate in a global 
setting.  
Using  principal component analysis (PCA), SentUK is obtained by means of 3 
individual sentiment indicators: turnover, the volatility premium and the 
consumer confidence index4.  
                                                          
2 Size is measured as the market capitalization and volatility is obtained as the standard deviation of 
stock returns for the previous twelve months 
3 Previous studies include investor survey findings (Brown and Cliff (2005)), dividend premium 
(Baker and Wurgler (2004)), and turnover (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)), among others. 
4 The reason for the choice of these measures is their relationship with the level of sentiment used by 
Baker and Wurgler (2006), together with data availability. Constructional details of the turnover 
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The same PCA procedure is used to construct the global investor sentiment 
index that captures the common component in the US sentiment and European 
(EU) sentiment. As a proxy for the US sentiment, we use the composite index 
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), BW, which includes 6 different 
individual sentiment measures. The EU sentiment indicator is calculated as an 
index constructed using the commonality of the 4 local indexes corresponding to the 
four key European markets in cap terms, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. 
These domestic indexes, as in the case of SentUK, are calculated including 
consumer confidence, turnover and volatility premium.  
Note that each sentiment index is likely to include a sentiment component as 
well as a common economic cycle component. For this reason, all individual 
measures are first orthogonalized by a series of macro-economic variables5 to 
explicitly remove the effect of possible changes in the economic cycle. 
Our final database consists of 25648 observations involving 228 stocks and 3170 
analysts belonging to 376 brokerage houses. Some descriptive statistics of the 
variables used are shown in Table 1. 
 
4.-Methodology and Results 
4.1.-Measuring herding: the BCK-S statistic and results for hypothesis H1 
Bernhardt et al (2006) propose a statistic for measuring herding or anti-herding 
in analyst forecasts. The BCK-S statistic is based on the probability that an 
analyst’s unbiased forecast exceeds or falls short of the prior consensus by 0.5, and 
is calculated by means of the following equation:     
 






  (1) 
 
where 𝑧  and 𝑧  are conditioning events, 𝑧  being when the analyst’s forecast 
exceeds the extant consensus6, 𝑧  being when it falls short and  being the time 
                                                                                                                                                                          
index can be found in Baker and Stein (2004), and those of the volatility premium in Baker et al. 
(2012). The consumer confidence index, which is available from the European Commission website, 
has been used in numerous studies, such as Brown and Cliff (2005), Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006), and Schmeling (2009), among others. 
5 Following Baker and Wurgler (2006), and Schmeling (2009), the macroeconomic variables 
considered are the industrial output index, durable and non-durable goods consumption, and the 
unemployment rate. 




(quarterly/monthly intervals) to collect the forecasts. The conditioning indicator 
functions can be defined as follows: 
𝛾  is unity in the event of 𝑧  and 0 otherwise. 
𝛾  is unity in the event of 𝑧  and  0 otherwise. 
The overshooting indicator functions are defined as follows: 
𝛿  is unity in the event of 𝑧  and the forecast falls short of the actual earnings 
and zero otherwise. 
𝛿  is unity in the event of  𝑧  and the forecast exceeds the actual earnings and 
zero otherwise. 










 is the estimate of the conditional probability of overshooting actual 
earnings given that the forecast exceeds the consensus and 
∑
∑
 is the estimate of 
the conditional probability of falling short of true earnings given that the forecast 
falls short of the consensus. The null hypothesis that analysts’ forecasts are 
unbiased implies that S is 0.5.  S<0.5 would indicate the presence of herding by 
analysts, while S>0.5 would indicate anti-herding. It is interesting to note that 
each component of the S statistic is valuable, given that it computes the conditional 
probability of overshooting or underestimating actual earnings. 
The literature has provided measures for testing for herding by analysts: Olsen 
(1996) (where it is measured as the relative tightness of forecast distribution); De 
Bondt and Forbes (1999) (which uses the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasting 
accuracy); Chen and Jiang (2006) (underweighting of private information); Clement 
and Tse (2005) (comparison of forecast with deviation from consensus and previous 
forecast), among others. The BCK-S statistic appears superior to previous 
measures (Olsen (1996); De Bondt and Forbes (1999); Chen and Jiang (2006) or 
Clement and Tse (2005) among others) because it is conservative in the presence of 
cross-sectional correlation and robust to forecast target mismeasurement and 
systematic optimism by analysts, both of which could lead only to Type II errors. 
Being non-parametric, moreover, this test is unaffected by the magnitude of the 
errors. 
Table 2 shows the quarterly and monthly estimates of the BCK-S statistic for all 
stocks without being differentiated by the difficulty of their assessment. This 
analysis considers all forecasts, with or without the analysts´ name, and also 
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taking into account the Hribar and McInnis (2012) procedure of removing stocks 
with less than 0.10 pounds forecasts.  
Because S is strictly lower than 0.5 in both time frequencies, the results suggest 
the presence of herding, especially using monthly information which is expected to 
be more accurate. The persistence of the estimates for both also suggests the 
robustness of the calculations, showing clear evidence that analysts herd in the UK 
market and, therefore, that hypothesis 1 is confirmed. However, it should be 
emphasized that mimetic behavior is more intense when analysts give pessimistic 
information. 
 
4.2.-Measuring the effect of investor sentiment on herding and the results of 
hypothesis H2.  
Since it has become clear that analysts herd around the consensus, Hypothesis 2 
examines whether investor sentiment influences the analysts´ herding behavior. To 
address this question, the following model is estimated: 
 
𝑆 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅 + 𝑢 ,  (2) 
 
where Si,t is the dependent variable which captures the value of the measure 
used as a proxy for herding behavior (BCK-S statistic) with respect to firm i during 
the month t; βp denotes the coefficient estimates and uit is the error term. Sent 
denotes the investor sentiment variable. Since we want to test whether the effect of 
investor sentiment has a local or more global connotation, we estimate three 
different dimensions of investor sentiment. We differentiate between the local 
sentiment calculated using UK data and the global sentiment calculated using 
international/worldwide data and, finally, a joint effect. 
Additionally, in line with Mensah and Yang (2008), we include the control 
variables7 described in the previous section. In the OLS estimation, the standard 
errors are clustered by stock and adjusted for heteroskedasticity and serial 
autocorrelation. Year dummies are also included to check for time effects.  
In order to observe the effect of investor sentiment on the two components of the 
BCK-S statistic, two additional estimations of Equation 2 are carried out 
considering as dependent variables either the probability of a positive forecast 
(above current earnings given that the forecast exceeds the extant consensus) or 
                                                          
7 The observations are winsorized at the 99% level. 
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the probability of a negative forecast (below current earnings given that the 
forecast falls short of the extant consensus). 
The results are presented in Table 38. Panel A shows the estimates when local 
sentiment is used. It can be confirmed that investor sentiment has a significant 
effect on analysts´ herding behavior. In fact, the BCK-S statistic indicates that the 
greater the optimism, the lower the S value, implying more herding. The effect on 
both components of S is also significant. However, it is noted that in optimistic 
situations when investor sentiment is high, analysts transmitting positive views 
tend to imitate each other less whereas they tend to imitate more intensively when 
transmitting negative views. 
These results show that local sentiment in the UK affects the behavior of 
analysts reporting in this market. However, some papers such as Chang et al. 
(2012), Baker et al. (2012) or Corredor et al. (2013), among others, find that the 
effect of investor sentiment is a global phenomenon. Panel B presents the 
corresponding estimates for equation 2 when the global sentiment is considered. 
The results are also significant at the 1% significance level in the case of positive 
forecasts, given that an increase in investor sentiment induces an increase in the 
herding measure, indicating a lower herding level. In the case of negative opinions, 
the influence of market sentiment on the herding measure is also significant but 
negative at the 1% significance level. Globally considered, it could be said that the 
effect of global sentiment on each component of the BCK-S statistic is consistent 
with the results obtained using the local sentiment. The results using the local and 
the global sentiment individually, although with different significance levels, 
indicate that investor sentiment influences analysts´ herding behavior. Given these 
results, it may be of interest to know the interaction between these two sentiment 
measures, given that both sentiment indices may share some common information. 
A causality analysis was therefore carried out to determine their relationship 9. The 
results of the Granger test did not allow us to reject the null hypothesis that one 
sentiment measure causes the other. Nevertheless, in order to correct the possible 
influence of the global sentiment on the local sentiment, the local sentiment was 
                                                          
8 For the sake of clarity, in the remainder of the paper we report only the estimations performed on 
named analysts’ forecast data using the method employed in Hribar and McInnis (2012). It is worth 
noting, however, that the results coincide with those obtained using the alternative sample. 
9 The causality test was carried out through a VAR technique where both indices were included. 




orthogonalized so that it could be divided into two parts, the global sentiment 
component and the specific UK component free of global effects. 
The model proposed to test the joint influence of the global component and the 
strictly local component of sentiment is as follows:  
𝑆 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑂𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑆 +
𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅 + 𝑢 ,           (3) 
 
where the variables included are defined as in eq. (2), Sent is the global 
component and ResSentOrtogonal is the local sentiment free of the global influence. 
The results for these estimates are shown in table 3 Panel C. As expected, 
these results confirm the relevance of investor sentiment, either under a local or a 
global perspective, and the asymmetric effect on the herding measure when 
analysts release more positive information and when they issue more negative 
forecasts. 
We can conclude that analysts are influenced by investor sentiment differently 
depending on the type of recommendation being released. If there is optimism in 
the market and analysts have to issue more positive perspectives, they do not mind 
deviating from the consensus because they do not expect significant negative 
consequences if they make an individual mistake or overestimate their forecasts. 
However, when analysts issue more negative perspectives, they prefer to move 
closer to the consensus in order to avoid reputational costs. 
 
4.3- Investor Sentiment in difficult situations. The result of H3. 
Analysts in the UK are influenced by investor sentiment. Depending on such 
sentiment and their own information and analysis, they tend to intensify their 
herding tendency or otherwise. 
In order to explore the influence of sentiment in more difficult situations, 
hypothesis 3 is split into two parts. Hypothesis H3a refers to cases in which 
analysts´ information induces negative forecasts at times of high sentiment. The 
results and the interpretation of this first difficult situation can once again be 
found in the last columns of table 3. When analysts transmit negative forecasts and 
investor sentiment is optimistic, they feel less confident and tend to herd more 
intensively. 
The purpose of H3b is to test whether analysts´ herd behavior becomes more 
intensive when they have to forecast the future development of hard-to-value 
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assets. Initially this hypothesis could be tested only taking into account the type of 
asset as an explanatory variable of the herding measure. However, the literature 
relating to the influence of sentiment on asset returns has also shown that this 
effect is enlarged when forecasting the most hard-to-value assets. Perhaps the 
results concerning sentiment and hard-to-value stocks may be combined or could 
complement each other. If analysts herd more when they analyze hard-to-value 
stocks at specific moments when optimistic investor sentiment plays an important 
role and, additionally, investor sentiment particularly affects hard-to-value assets, 
it is possible that the effect of hard-to-value assets on herding may be due to 
sentiment. Three models have been used to test hypothesis H3b. The first model 
(eq. 4) simply tries to test the influence of the type of asset on the herding measure. 
As already mentioned, the firms in the sample have been ranked according to four 
variables: volatility, size, book-to-market ratio and dividend payout. The portfolios 
including those companies with lowest volatility, largest size, lowest BTM and that 
pay the highest dividends are considered easy-to-value (EVQ) firms whereas hard-
to-value (HVQ) companies are those included in the quintile with the highest 
volatility, smallest size, largest BTM and those that do not pay dividends.   
𝑆 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅 + 𝑢 ,   
           (4) 
The second model (eq. 5) includes as independent variables both sentiment and 
the extreme quintile portfolios calculated for all the characteristics under study.  
 
𝑆 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑂𝑅 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑆 +
𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅 + 𝑢 ,           (5) 
In these equations (4 and 5) the variables, NEPS, HOR, NAFF, CHES and 
FERR are defined as in eq.3, the variable associated with investor sentiment is 
taken as local sentiment given its significance in our previous results, and two 
additional variables are included representing extreme quintiles: EVQ, a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 when the firm is in the “easy-to-value” quintile and 0 
otherwise; HVQ, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the stock is considered as 
a “hard-to-value” asset and 0 otherwise. The equations are estimated 4 times 
taking volatility, size, book-to-market and dividends as variables that identify the 
difficulty of valuation. 
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When analysts face hard-to-value stocks, sentiment may also have an 
asymmetric effect. When there is high investor sentiment in the market, analysts 
may feel more confident following the consensus when they evaluate hard-to-value 
stocks whereas such an effect is not as clear when they face easy-to-value stocks. 
Corredor et al. (2016) find that the effectiveness of analysts´ recommendations is 
reduced by investor sentiment only in relation to highly sentiment-sensitive stocks. 
It is therefore of interest to test whether sentiment may enhance analysts´ herding 
when they deal with hard-to-value stocks.  
So, equation (6) also includes the interaction effect between investor sentiment 
and the extreme quintiles, in order to test the possible relation between sentiment 
and the asset characteristics. 
𝑆 , = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐸𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝑉𝑄 + 𝛽 𝑁𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑂𝑅 +
𝛽 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽 𝐶𝐻𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽 𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑅 + 𝑢 ,        (6) 
 
The corresponding estimates are found in Tables 410 and 5. When only the 
extreme quintiles are considered, the results for the S statistic (table 4) indicate 
that analysts´ herding significantly decreases in the case of easy-to-value stocks11. 
The results for the components of the S statistic also reveal that when the 
dependent variable is the probability of more positive forecasts (above current 
earnings) we do not find significant results, indicating that analysts do not modify 
their herding behavior (except in the case of the largest/smallest size stocks, where 
analysts decrease/increase their mimetic tendency). Nevertheless, when analysts 
release more negative recommendations or forecasts, they tend to herd less when 
they are evaluating easy-to-value stocks12. 
When investor sentiment is included in the analysis (table 5), this behavioral 
pattern is maintained and sentiment has a negative effect on S, i.e. increasing 
herding activity. When the interaction between investor sentiment and the type of 
assets is included, the corresponding estimate does not offer significant results at a 
5% significance level, and we cannot conclude that analysts tend to herd more 
                                                          
10 Henceforth, for the sake of clarity, we present only the monthly estimates. The quarterly estimates, 
which are consistent with the latter, are available from the authors upon request. 
11 When the size variable is used to classify the assets, it is also observed that herding increases in 
hard-to-value portfolios. 
12 When the volatility variable is used to classify the assets, it is also observed that herding increases 
in hard-to-value portfolios. 
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intensively when analyzing sentiment-sensitive stocks at times of high investor 
sentiment13. 
The results for the components of the S statistic also reveal robustness when 
analysts issue forecasts below current earnings: sentiment increases herding 
whereas easy-to-value stocks lead to reduced herding. Therefore, when there is 
high optimistic sentiment in the market and analysts´ views are negative, these 
analysts are prone to herd in order to avoid negative consequences for their 
prestige and remuneration should their negative forecasts prove to be incorrect.  
This is not the case when they are assessing easy-to-value stocks, given that in this 
case analysts feel more confident in their views and reduce their herding behavior.  
The results of the estimates when the dependent variable is the probability of 
positive forecasts (i.e. above current earnings) are different and coincide with the 
results obtained when H2 was tested: when analysts transmit positive forecasts 
and investor sentiment is optimistic, they feel more confident and tend to follow 
their own beliefs. We do not find significant results in the herding of analysts when 
they forecast hard or easy assets, indicating that they do not modify their herding 
behavior (except in the case of the largest size stocks, where analysts decrease 
their mimetic tendency and in the smallest size stocks where the herding 
increases).  
When the interaction component is included in the model, the significance of 
investor sentiment and the significance of the results obtained for easy-to-value 
stocks remain robust. 
We can conclude that the estimates of the S statistic could suggest that, 
generally speaking, sentiment increases herding whereas easy-to-value stocks 
reduce it. However, it is worth mentioning that such a general conclusion does not 
hold if the S statistic is split into its two components, that is, it does not hold for 
every type of analysts´ recommendation. Investor sentiment affects analysts´ 
herding behavior differently depending on the analysts´ views. However, it seems 
clear that analysts tend to reduce their imitative behavior when they forecast easy-
to-value stocks, regardless of investor sentiment at the time.  
 
5.-Conclusions 
                                                          
13 The influence on the S statistic is only significant for hard-to-value portfolios when the assets are 
ranked by size, for which mimetic behavior intensifies when sentiment and portfolio are taken into 
account.   
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The aim of this paper is to test whether investor sentiment may influence 
herding practices among analysts in the UK market.  For this purpose, we use the 
BCK-S statistic (Bernhardt et al. (2006)) which is based on the conditional 
probability that an analyst’s unbiased forecast exceeds or falls short of the prior 
consensus. Besides its global usefulness, this statistic enables us to analyze 
herding practices both in the case of optimistic releases and pessimistic releases. In 
particular, we want to test whether two specific difficult situations may increase 
herding levels among analysts; the case in which analysts´ information leads to 
negative forecasts at times of high sentiment and the case in which they have to 
forecast the future development of hard-to-value assets and such a difficulty may 
interact with sentiment. 
Our main results indicate that sentiment clearly affects herding among 
analysts. However, this influence is not symmetric if analysts release optimistic or 
pessimistic information. Herding decreases when analysts release optimistic 
information at times when market sentiment is positive. In contrast, herding tends 
to increase when analysts release pessimistic information when investor sentiment 
is high. We conjecture that this latter situation is explained by analysts attempting 
to avoid negative consequences for their prestige and remuneration if their own 
individual negative forecasts or recommendations prove to be mistaken, given that 
collective errors are usually penalized less than individual errors. 
However, the herding increase induced by the “difficult” situation of releasing 
a pessimistic forecast which goes against the market sentiment, as well as the 
herding decrease induced by the “easy” situation of releasing a positive forecast at 
times of high sentiment, may vary depending on the degree of difficulty that 
analysts find when they analyze a specific firm. Easy-to-value companies represent 
an easier situation for analysts than hard-to-value companies. Our results indicate 
that easy-to-value stocks tend to decrease herding behavior among security 
analysts, particularly when they release pessimistic information. But the 
interaction between easy-to-value stocks and market sentiment is not significant 
and does not modify the existing herding behavior. 
However, in general hard-to-value stocks do not significantly increase herding 
among analysts, and neither does the interaction between hard-to-value stocks and 
sentiment. When analysts face hard-to-value stocks, they may employ internal 
mechanisms that assess contextual factors and determine that the profits to be 
made from following their peers are not sufficient to outweigh the possible cost of 
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an individual error, perhaps because there is no clear consensus to follow given the 
degree of difficulty. Herding in this “difficult” situation may only marginally 
increase their payoff due to the insufficient reward provided as compared to the 
psychological cost of not following their beliefs. This reasoning could raise the 
question:  how do analysts determine when herding is appropriate? 
To sum up, the results of this paper suggest that, on the one hand, “easy 
situations” such as analyzing easy-to-value securities and releasing optimistic 
information at times of high market sentiment clearly reduce herding practices, 
whereas herding clearly increases when analysts release more negative 
information at moments of high sentiment. It is to be expected that this last result 
is scarcely avoidable, despite the existence of regulations designed to ensure 
impartial investment recommendations and the avoidance of conflicts of interest 
that could undermine disclosure. The reaction to market sentiment and the 
tendency to herd, even when rationally justified by a conscious decision not to risk 
the analyst’s prestige or remuneration, cannot be easily identified and 
consequently controlled. In this case, institutional investors or other sophisticated 
investors can try to make a profit from this bias if they can detect that such a 
herding reaction is taking place. Nevertheless, if this effect of sentiment on herding 
practices is anticipated and discounted when investors take their investment 
decisions, the final effect on the market should not be significant. 
 
The framework of this paper is limited to a single country and, therefore, the 
conclusions obtained are valid for the same or, at most, a similar environment. The 
possible extension of the area of study to other countries with differentiated 
characteristics would enrich its scope and allow the conclusions to be generalized. 
In addition, this analysis includes a time period in which the Brexit has not yet 
materialized, so future expansion of the work would have the advantage of 
knowing the implications of this or other similar significant events on the behavior 
of analysts. Future research could be oriented to the analysis of event studies in 
general and their effects on the herding of analysts. Following this approach,  
broadening the database of analysts by including other countries  together with a 
consideration of events or circumstances that may imply structural changes might 
be of interest  from the point of view of deepening our  knowledge and 
understanding of analysts' behavior14.  
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Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics. This table presents the descriptive statistics for 
the sample. Volatility (VOL) is the last twelve months' standard deviation in percentage 
terms. Size (SIZE) is the stock market capitalization of each firm in millions of Euros. The 
book-to-market ratio (BTM) is the ratio between the two values. Dividend (DPS) is the end 
of month dividend per share ratio. Sent UK is the local investor sentiment. Sent Global is a 
proxy of the world sentiment index. FE is the mean of the forecast earnings error. It is 
calculated as the actual earnings minus the EPS forecast for the fiscal year and scaled by 
the absolute value of the EPS forecast. Forecast horizon (HOR) is the number of days 
between an analyst's forecast issue and the end of that fiscal year. Number of forecasts 
(NEPS). Number of analysts following a firm (NAFF) is the sum of all analysts following a 
given firm in a given fiscal year. Changes in historical earnings stability (CHES) is the 
standard deviation of the last five years’ earnings. Average analyst forecasting errors  for a 
given firm in a given fiscal year (FERR). 
Variable Mean StDev 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile 
Firms      
VOL 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.12 
SIZE 4224.99 11429.47 268.47 818.67 2139.68 
BTM 0.62 0.38 0.34 0.55 0.84 
DPS 10.14 13.02 1.83 6.59 13.51 
Sentiment      
Sent UK 0.07 0.99 -0.49 -0.25 0.76 
Sent Global -0.10 0.94 -0.69 0.06 0.37 
Analysts      
FE -0.02 0.48 -0.29 -0.09 0.39 
NEPS 7.81 6.32 3.00 6.00 10.00 
HOR 186.84 102.78 96.00 185.00 281.00 
NAFF 8.18 5.08 4.67 7.00 10.14 
CHES 0.23 0.49 0.05 0.11 0.23 
FERR 0.11 1.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.11 
 
 
Table 2. Results of the quarterly and monthly estimations of the S statistic for 
one-year forecasts FY1, over the firm sample as a whole. (a) Obtained using all 
available analyst forecast data and (b) obtained removing stocks with absolute earnings 
forecasts of less than 0.10 euros. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are reported in 
square brackets. Pr(F>A) indicates the probability of the analyst forecast exceeding actual 
earnings (F value of the analyst forecast, A: realized earnings). Pr(F>A/z+) is the first 
component of S which indicates the probability of the analyst forecast exceeding actual 
earnings conditioned to z+, Pr(F<A/z-) the second component of S which indicates the 
probability of the analyst’s forecast being lower than actual earnings conditioned to z-. 
N Pr(F>A) Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-) S 
(a)Quarterly Data 12955 0.461 0.504 0.488 0.496 
     [0.491;0.501] 
(b)Quarterly Data  12223 0.456 0.501 0.493 0.497 
 [0.492;0.502] 
(a)Monthly Data 25648 0.481 0.497 0.471 0.484 
 [0.480;0.488] 






Table 3. Results of regression analysis of the sentiment effect on herding. Si,t is the 
dependent variable that captures the value of the proxy herding statistic for firm i during 
month (quarter) t. Sent is the proxy of investor sentiment. Local (panel A), global (panel B) 
sentiment measures and global and orthogonal local sentiments (panel C). HOR (average 
age of forecasts used to estimate S), NEPS (number of individual forecasts), NAFF (number 
of analysts following a firm), CHES (standard deviation of quarterly earnings per share), 
FERR (average forecast error for each firm-period).  
 
Panel A Quarterly Data  Monthly Data 
S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-)  S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-) 
















local -0.005 0.09 0.011 0.08 -0.021 0.00 
 
-0.006 0.04 0.031 0.00 -0.043 0.00 
NEPS 0.003 0.00 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.00  0.007 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.46 -0.001 0.00  -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.53 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.007 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.002 0.18  0.006 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.002 0.23 
CHES 0.001 0.76 0.001 0.40 -0.001 0.66  0.001 0.04 0.001 0.02 0.001 0.74 
FERR -0.007 0.28 -0.068 0.00 0.052 0.00  -0.018 0.01 -0.008 0.60 -0.029 0.11 
Intercept 0.476 0.00 0.398 0.00 0.555 0.00  0.448 0.00 0.438 0.00 0.464 0.00 
 
Panel B Quarterly Data  Monthly Data 
S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-)  S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-) 
















global -0.019 0.07 0.028 0.00 -0.040 0.00 
 
-0.025 0.01 0.069 0.00 -0.081 0.00 
NEPS 0.003 0.00 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.00  0.007 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.42 -0.001 0.00  -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.35 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.007 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.003 0.10  0.006 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.002 0.23 
CHES 0.001 0.74 0.001 0.53 -0.001 0.85  0.001 0.04 0.001 0.32 0.001 0.50 
FERR -0.008 0.27 -0.070 0.00 0.055 0.00  -0.018 0.01 -0.011 0.49 -0.027 0.13 
Intercept 0.466 0.00 0.449 0.00 0.499 0.00  0.434 0.00 0.471 0.00 0.475 0.00 
 
Panel C Quarterly Data  Monthly Data 
S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-)  S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-) 
















global -0.007 0.03 0.025 0.00 -0.034 0.00 
 
-0.009 0.06 0.033 0.00 -0.034 0.00 
Sent loc 
Orthog -0.001 0.61 0.012 0.10 -0.021 0.00 
 
-0.033 0.00 0.006 0.46 -0.016 0.02 
NEPS 0.004 0.00 0.002 0.01 0.003 0.00  0.007 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.47 -0.001 0.00  -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.34 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.007 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.003 0.13  0.006 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.002 0.21 
CHES -0.001 0.02 0.000 0.50 -0.000 0.79  0.001 0.03 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.73 
FERR -0.003 0.56 -0.070 0.00 0.054 0.00  -0.019 0.00 -0.011 0.46 0.025 0.15 




Table 4. Results of regression analysis of firm characteristics on herding. Si,t is the 
dependent variable that captures the value of the proxy herding statistic for firm i during 
month t, HVQ (hard-to-value firms,) EVQ (easy-to-value firms), HOR (average age of 
forecasts used to estimate S), NEPS (number of individual forecasts), NAFF (number of 
analysts following a firm), CHES (standard deviation of quarterly earnings per share), 
FERR (average forecast error for each firm-period).The stock characteristics are size 
(SIZE), volatility (VOL), BTM ratio (BTM) and dividend per share (DPS).  
S Pr(F>A/z+) Pr(F<A/z-) 
βs VOL 
  coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value 
EVQ 0.047 0.00 0.015 0.52 0.079 0.00 
HVQ -0.008 0.57 0.040 0.19 -0.057 0.04 
NEPS 0.007 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.36 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.005 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.001 0.35 
CHES 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.96 
FERR -0.017 0.01 -0.008 0.60 -0.025 0.14 
Intercept 0.501 0.00 0.554 0.00 0.447 0.00 
SIZE 
  coef p-value coef 
p-
value coef p-value 
EVQ 0.072 0.00 0.091 0.00 0.053 0.00 
HVQ -0.069 0.00 -0.096 0.00 -0.041 0.20 
NEPS 0.007 0.00 0.007 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.27 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.005 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.001 0.42 
 CHES  0.001 0.25 0.001 0.09 -0.000 0.69 
FERR -0.022 0.00 -0.014 0.35 -0.030 0.10 
Intercept 0.500 0.00 0.548 0.00 0.451 0.00 
BTM 
  coef p-value coef 
p-
value coef p-value 
EVQ 0.024 0.09 -0.001 0.99 0.048 0.01 
HVQ -0.021 0.16 -0.011 0.71 -0.031 0.26 
NEPS 0.007 0.00 0.008 0.02 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.35 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.006 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.002 0.25 
CHES 0.001 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.91 
FERR -0.018 0.01 -0.008 0.58 -0.027 0.13 
Intercept 0.507 0.00 0.562 0.00 0.452 0.00 
DPS 
  coef p-value coef 
p-
value coef p-value 
EVQ 0.027 0.08 0.008 0.72 0.046 0.02 
HVQ 0.001 0.94 0.005 0.85 -0.003 0.87 
NEPS 0.007 0.00 0.008 0.00 0.007 0.00 
HOR -0.001 0.00 0.000 0.34 -0.001 0.00 
NAFF 0.006 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.002 0.27 
CHES 0.001 0.11 0.001 0.01 -0.001 0.69 
FERR -0.018 0.01 -0.008 0.58 -0.027 0.13 
Intercept 0.504 0.00 0.558 0.00 0.449 0.00 
0 
 
Table 5. Results of regression analysis based on firm characteristics and sentiment simultaneously. Si,t is the dependent variable that 
captures the value of the proxy herding statistic for firm i during month t, HVQ (hard-to-value firms,) EVQ (easy-to-value firms). The stock 
characteristics are size (SIZE), volatility (VOL), BTM ratio (BTM) and dividend per share (DPS). Sent is the local investor sentiment. Control variables 
have been used in the estimation process, although for the sake of clarity they are not included in this table. 
















Sent -0.028 0.00 -0.026 0.00 0.068 0.00 0.032 0.00 -0.055 0.00 -0.072 0.00 
EVQ 0.047 0.00 0.047 0.00 0.015 0.51 0.013 0.57 0.079 0.00 0.079 0.00 
HVQ -0.006 0.64 -0.007 0.63 0.034 0.27 0.031 0.33 -0.054 0.05 -0.053 0.06 
EVQ*Sent -0.001 0.90 0.001 0.97 -0.002 0.80 
HVQ*Sent -0.006 0.30 -0.012 0.21 0.006 0.61 
SIZE 
Sent -0.026 0.00 -0.022 0.03 0.066 0.00 0.055 0.00 -0.056 0.00 -0.045 0.00 
EVQ 0.072 0.00 0.072 0.00 0.092 0.00 0.082 0.00 0.052 0.00 0.052 0.00 
HVQ -0.068 0.00 -0.069 0.00 -0.099 0.00 -0.101 0.00 -0.040 0.22 -0.039 0.23 
EVQ*Sent -0.006 0.17 0.004 0.73 -0.016 0.12 
HVQ*Sent -0.016 0.01 -0.018 0.13 -0.013 0.29 
BTM 
Sent -0.031 0.00 -0.029 0.00 0.068 0.00 0.073 0.00 -0.055 0.00 -0.058 0.00 
EVQ 0.024 0.09 0.024 0.09 -0.001 0.97 -0.001 0.96 0.049 0.01 0.048 0.01 
HVQ -0.021 0.16 -0.021 0.16 -0.011 0.71 -0.010 0.72 -0.031 0.26 -0.032 0.25 
EVQ*Sent -0.005 0.33 -0.016 0.18 0.005 0.57 
HVQ*Sent 0.002 0.96 -0.017 0.13 0.016 0.20 
DPS 
Sent -0.028 0.00 -0.027 0.00 0.068 0.00 0.066 0.00 -0.056 0.00 -0.052 0.00 
EVQ 0.027 0.08 0.027 0.08 0.011 0.65 0.011 0.65 0.045 0.02 0.045 0.02 
HVQ 0.001 0.89 0.002 0.89 0.001 0.95 0.001 0.95 -0.001 0.94 -0.001 0.94 
EVQ*Sent -0.002 0.57 -0.002 0.88 -0.004 0.69 
HVQ*Sent -0.001 0.84 0.007 0.47 -0.009 0.36 
 
